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A SUGGESTED CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDIANA STATUTES
AGAINST ACCUMULATIONS
ROBERT S. ASHBY*
Despite the frequent remarks' of the English judges to the effect that
the Thellusson Act 2 was badly drawn and difficult of construction, in 1945
Indiana adopted for its fourth statute against accumulations 3 a virtual para-
phrase of the English Act.' The Legslature evidently believed, and with some
*A member of the law firm of Barnes, Hickam, Pantzer & Boyd, Indianapolis.
A.B., 1938, Indiana University; LL.B., 1941, Harvard Law School.
1. Lord Chancellor Brougham, in Shaw v. Rhodes, 1 My. & Cr. 135, 141, 40 Eng.
Rep. 328, 330 (Ch. 1836), said: ". . . [The act] has hardly ever been discussed in
Courts either of law or equity, without the Judge having occasion to observe upon the
inartificial, and, in several respects, ill-defined language in which its provisions are
expressed." Ellis v. Maxwell, 3 Beav. 587, 596, 49 Eng. Rep. 231, 234 (Ch. 1841) : "The
difficulty of attributing a distinct and efficient meaning to all the words of this Act has
frequently been acknowledged." See Gertman v. Burdick, 123 F.2d 924, 928 (D. C. Cir.
1941) : "The [Thellusson] Act is not entirely a happy one."
2. 39 & 40 GEo. III, c.98 (1800) (also known as Lord Loughborough's Act). "... no
person or persons shall, after the passing of this act, by any deed or deeds, surrender or.
surrenders, will, codicil, or otherwise howsoever, settle or dispose of any real or personal
property, so and in such manner that the rents, issues, profits, or produce thereof, shall
be wholly or partially accumulated for any longer term than the life or lives of any such
grantor or grantors, settlor or settlors or the term of twenty-one years from the death of
any such grantor, settlor, devisor or testator, or during the minority or respective minori-
ties of any person or persons who shall be living, or in ventre sa inere at the time of the
death of such grantor, devisor, or testator, or during the minority or respective minorities
only of any person or persons who, under the uses or trusts of the deed, surrender, will,
or other assurances, directing such accumulations, would, for the time being, if of full age,
be entitled unto the rents, issues, and profits, or the interest, dividends, or annual produce,
so directed to be accumulated; and in every case where any accumulation shall be directed
otherwise than as aforesaid, such direction shall be null and void, and the rents, issues,
profits, and produce of such property so directed to be accumulated, shall, so long as
the same shall be directed to be accumulated contrary to the provisions of this act, go to
and be received by such person or persons as would have been entitled thereto if such
accumulation had not been directed.... ".Reenacted in the Law of Property Act, 1925,
15 GEO. V, c.20, §§164-6.
3. The first statute was enacted prior to 1852 [2 IND. REV. STAT. 1852, §2, c.9 , p. 245;
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1926) § 12172]. It appeared in the Revised Statutes of 1843,
Art. 1, c.31, p. 575, and may antedate that time. It applied only to personal property and
prohibited accumulations except "during the minority of the persons for whose benefit it
is intended." The accumulation was also required to "terminate at the expiration of their
minority."
The second statute enacted in 1941 (Ind. Acts 1941, c.218) also applied only to ac-
cumulations of the proceeds of personal property and prohibited accumulations except for
the benefit of minors. However, such accumulations might endure until the minor
reached the age of thirty.
The third statute (Ind. Acts 1943, c.92) permitted accumulations which would endure
for lives in being, and made no restrictions upon the purpose of the accumulation.
4. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1945) §51-106. "No person may by any instrument
or otherwise settle or dispose of any property in such manner that the income thereof shall,
save as provided in section 3 [§51-107], be wholly or partially accumulated for any longer
period than one of the following, namely:
(a) the life of the grantor or settlor, or
(b) a term of twenty-one [21] years from the effective date of the
instrument, or
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justification, that the resolved uncertainties of the English act were less to be
feared than the unsuspected ambiguities of a new statute.
I. SELECTION OF THE STATUTORY PERIOD
The present Indiana statute prohibits accumulations for any longer than:
(a) the life of the grantor or settlor, or
(b) twenty-one years from the effective date of the instrument, or
(c) twenty-one years from the death of the grantor, settlor, or
testator; or
(d) ten years beyond the minority of a beneficiary in being on the
effective date of the instrument for the benefit of such minor.
It is obvious from the language used in the Indiana act, and in the Thellusson
Act, that the periods listed are each exclusive. The periods cannot be combined
to sustain an accumulation which could not be sustained under one of them
alone.5 Therefore, the primary problem presented by both acts concerns the
method of determining which of the statutory periods is to be applied in
judging the validity of any particular accumulation. The selection of a
standard must necessarily be made after the conveyance directing or resulting
in an accumulation has been construed, and it is clear that in England the
meaning of the conveyance is determined without reference to the accumula-
tions statute.' Re Errington well expresses this principle:
One must find out what was the intention of the testator or settlor,
and must do that as if the Thellusson Act had never been passed.
Having arrived at the intention as a question of construction, you
must then bring in the paramount authority of the Legislature to
see how far that intention can be supported. . ..
The search for the appropriate statutory period under the English act
has precipitated a number of judicial statements which are of doubtful help-
fulness in discovering which period is proper in a particular case.
Kekewich, J., in Re Errington, explained the process of choice in the
following language:
The Legislature has left me at large to apply one or other of those
periods whichever will fit the case. What it has said according to the
cases about which there is no doubt is, that you cannot apply more
(c) a term of twenty-one [21] years from the death of the grantor,
settlor, or testator; or
(d) ten [10] years beyond the minority of a beneficiary in being on the
effective date of the instrument for the benefit of such minor."
5. Wilson v. Wilson, 1 Sim. (N.S.) 288, 61 Eng. Rep. 111 (Ch. 1851).
6. Shaw v. Rhodes, 1 My. & Cr. 135, 40 Eng. Rep. 328 (Ch. 1836). But cf. In re Tal-
bot's Will, 170 Misc. 138, 9 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Surr. Ct. Orange Co. 1939), 52 HARV. L. REv.
1369, where the court relied upon the presumed intention of the testator not to direct an
invalid accumulation.
7. 76 L.T.R. (N.S.) 616, 617 (Ch. 1897).
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than one, and that you must choose that one which fits the case. You
are not to choose the one which will give the longest period of
accumulations, you are not to choose the one which you may suppose
would best effectuate the intention, but you are to take the one that
actually fits the intention as declared.8
The court was considering an inter vivos marriage settlement in which
the settlor directed an accumulation of income from certain policies of life
insurance upon third persons until the policies should fall due. The settlor
died prior to the policies falling due and, upon the death of the insured, the
trustees of the fund applied to the court for determination of the end of the
period of accumulation. The court said that the period could be either that
measured by the life of the settlor, or that measured by a term of twenty-one
years from the death of the settlor. The settlor could not have intended
that the accumulation take place from his death, because, since the insured
might have died before the settlor, there would be a possible interval during
which the trustees would not know what to do with the fund in hand. Al-
though they could invest it, there was no direction as to disposition of the
income. Accordingly, the court held that the statutory period of the life of
the settlor best fitted the disposition which the testator had made.
A second English case illustrating the difficulty of selecting a period
under the Thellusson Act is Jagger v. Jagger."0 The settlor as part of an
inter vivos trust agreement directed that during his life, his wife's life, and the
life of the survivor the income from the trust res be applied for the support
of his wife and children. The surplus was to accumulate and upon the death
of the survivor it was to be applied, with the principal, in trust for all the
children who should reach the age of twenty-one years. The settlor died before
his wife, leaving minor children surviving him. The court held the accumula-
tion was valid for the period of the life of the grantor. The period of twenty-
one years from the death of the grantor could not apply because the accumula-
tion was to begin from the date of the settlement. The period of the minority
of persons living at the time of the grantor's death could not apply, even
though there were infant children living at the date of the deed and at the
grantor's death. This period, said the court, applied only where the accumula-
tion was to begin from the date of the grantor's death, ". . . and to say that
the accumulation may begin at the date of the settlement, whilst the grantor
is living, and continue during his lifetime and afterwards during the minorities
of the children, is, in effect, to contend that the Act is cumulative. . . ."" Nor
could the period of minority of persons who would, if of full age, be entitled
8. Id. at 617.
9. The English statute does not, as does the Indiana statute, sustain an accumulation
for a period of twenty-one years from the date of the instrument.
10. 49 L.T.R. (N.S.) 667 (Ch. 1884).
11. Id. at 669.
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to the accumulated income be the appropriate measure, because the children
were not absolutely entitled to the fund. It might be drawn on for support
of the mother; and only the surplus was to accumulate.
The rule to be adduced from these few cases, which expressly consider
the problem of selecting a statutory period, has been stated in the following
language:
The English statute lists four possible periods. Since only one is
permitted, the question may be asked: Which period do we apply in a
given case? This question is particularly difficult when a part of the
accumulation is admittedly illegal and it is a matter of determining
how much is valid. It has been said that the determination of the
appropriate period under the English act is a matter of construction;
and it would seem that such appropriateness is determined as of the
time the instrument takes effect. 2
It may be doubted, however, whether this conclusion is entirely helpful
or free from ambiguity. 13 No irrevocable choice of a period must, or in some
cases, can be made as of the time the instrument takes effect. It may be
possible at that time to state that if fact situation A develops the accumulation
may be sustained under a specified period, and if fact situation B develops
the accumulation may be sustained under another specified period. The
English courts have tended to examine the deed or will, and if the accumula-
tion could be sustained at the time of examination under any of the statutory*
periods, and also could have been sustained under the same provision since
the beginning of the accumulation, that period is applied and the accumulation
held valid. For example, in M'Donald v. Bryce,'4 the testator left property
in trust for the use of R upon his reaching the age of twenty-one; in default
of that to the male issue of P reaching the age of twepty-one; and in default
of that over to A, B and C in equal shares. R was a minor at the testator's
death, and the direction for accumulation was in substance to accumulate dur-
ing the minority of R. In fact, however, R died before reaching the age of
twenty-one and after the death of the testator. The court held that the
accumulation was valid for twenty-one years from the testator's death. At
the time the instrument took effect, at the testator's death, there was a minor
in being; and the accumulation directed exactly fitted he third period of the
English statute-it was an accumulation during the minority of a person in
being at the death of the testator. This did not prevent the court at a later
date from applying the period of the statute permitting accumulations for
12. Simes, Statutory Restrictions on the Accumulation of Income, 7 U. OF CmI. L. REv.
409, 415 (1940).
13. Cf. In re Cattell (1907), 1 Ch. 567.
14. 2 Keen 276, 48 Eng. Rep. 634 (Ch. 1838).
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twenty-one years after the testator's death, when the premature death of the
minor rendered the minority provision inappropriate. 15
Although the English judges have not expressly so stated, in every instance
they seem to have applied the statutory period which would sustain the accumu-
lation for the longest time."0 This has most frequently resulted in application
of the second period of the English statute: twenty-one years from the death
of the settlor or testator. The twenty-one year period has been applied where
the direction was to accumulate until a minor reached a certain age in excess
of twenty-one years ;7 where the direction was to accumulate until persons not
yet in being reached a certain age ;18 where the direction was to accumulate for
a flat period of years ;19 where the direction was to accumulate until a named
sum had been amassed ;20 and where the direction was to accumulate during
15. It may be said that the testator directed three contingent accumulations and that
each, from the testator's death, was measured by a different period, but this does not solve
the problem. At different times different statutory periods were appropriate to justify a
single continuing accumulation. To the same effect is Jones v. Maggs, 9 Hare 605, 68
Eng. Rep. 654 (Ch. 1852).
16. An apparently contrary result has been reached in Illinois, which has a statute
similar to the Thellusson Act. In Wills v. Southwell, 334 IIl. 448, 166 N.E. 70 (1929),
a testator directed accumulations for the benefit of each of his children until each child
reached the age of forty. At the testator's death, three of his children were adult and
would reach age forty within twenty-one years of the testator's death. The fourth child
was seventeen years old at her father's death, and she would not reach forty within
twenty-one years. The court indicated that the accumulation would be good only until
the fourth child reached twenty-one. Had the court applied the twenty-one year period
rather than the minority period, the accumulation could have been sustained for seven-
teen additional years-until the last child reached thirty-eight. The court gives no rea-
son for its conclusion. It might be explained on the ground that the Illinois statute [I4L.
REv. STAT., c. 30, §153 (1947)], unlike the Thellusson Act and the Indiana statute, is so
worded as to require application of the shortest permissible period.
17. Jones v. Maggs, 9 Hare 605, 68 Eng. Rep. 654 (Ch. 1852) ; M'Donald v. Bryce,
2 Keen 276, 48 Eng. Rep. 634 (Ch. 1838) ; Shaw v. Rhodes, 1 My. & Cr. 135, 40 Eng. Rep.
328 (Ch. 1836) ; Crawley v. Crawley, 7 Sim. 427, 58 Eng. Rep. 901 (Ch. 1835). A simi-
lar result has been reached in an unreported Indiana case. In Madeline Shields Powell v.
Indiana Trust Company, #24261, decided by the Morgan Circuit Court on May 26, 1950,
the court considered a testamentary trust providing for an accumulation until the young-
est of the testator's children reached the age of 30. At the testator's death the youngest
child was eleven years of age, and the accumulation could therefore endure only for 19
years. It was held valid under clause (c) of the statute permitting an accumulation for
21 years from the testator's death. The accumulation also would extend 1 year less than
10 years beyond the minority of a minor in being on the effective date of the instrument,
but it was not exclusively for the benefit of the minor, remainddr interests being given
to the testator's grandchildren. The court correctly declined to apply clause (d) of the
statute for the purpose of invalidating an accumulation which could be sustained under
clause (c).
18. Edwards v. Tuck, 3 De G. M. & G. 40, 43 Eng. Rep. 17 (Ch. 1853) ; Ellis v.
Maxwell, 3 Beav. 587, 49 Eng. Rep. 231 (Ch. 1841) ; Haley v. Bannister, 4 Madd. 275,
56 Eng. Rep. 707 (Ch. 1820) ; Longdon v. Simsion, 12 Ves. Jun. 295, 33 Eng. Rep. 113
(Gh. 1806).
19. Nettleton v. Stephenson, 3 De G. & Sm. 366, 64 Eng. Rep. 518 (Ch. 1849) ; cf.
In re Hawkins (1916), 2 Ch. 570.
20. Oddie v. Brown, 4 De G. & J. 179, 45 Eng. Rep. 70 (Ch. 1859).
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the life or lives of a named person or persons.2' The fact that the accumula-
tion was for the benefit of a minor has not resulted in termination of the
accumulation at the end of the minority when it could be sustained for a longer
period under the twenty-one year provision.22
Because the Thellusson Act, unlike the Indiana statute, omits as a permis-
sible period for accumulation a term of twenty-one years from the effective
date of the instrument, and permits accumulation only for a term of twenty-
one years from the death of the settlor, it has been necessary for the English
courts in inter vivos conveyances to limit the period of accumulation to the
life of the settlor, although that life might turn out to be less than twenty-
one years.- Thus, in li the Matter of Lady Rosslyn's Trust, the settlor had
created an inter vivos trust to accumulate the income for the joint lives of
James and Jane and to pay the income from the principal and accumulations
to Jane for life, and on Jane's death to hold the proceeds of the accumulation
in trust for Charlotte after she reached the age of twenty-one. The conveyance
was made in 1817; the settlor died in 1826; James died in 1847; and Jane died
in 1848. Charlotte had reached the age of twenty-one in 1819. The court
indicated that the accumulation ". . . ought to be held to be good for so much
of the joint lives as expired during [the settlor's] life; and that it ought to be
held void for remander. ' ' 24 This holding resulted in the accumulation lasting
for a period of nine years, until the settlor's death. In a similar case, applica-
tion of the Indiana statute should result in the accumulation being sustained
for a minimum period of twenty-one years from the effective date of the
instrument, and if the settlor lived for a longer period, then until her death.
It may be concluded that the Thellusson Act does not strike down any
accumulation which, since its beginning, could have been supported under any
one of the statutory periods; and that of two periods, otherwise equally appro-
priate, the one which will sustain the accumulation for the longer time win
be applied. There is no reason to believe that these conclusions are not equally
applicable to the Indiana statute.
21. Re Blake, 156 L.T.R. (N.S.) 231 (C.A. 1937) ; In re Walpole, 102 L. J. 209 (Ch.
1932) ; In re Pope (1901), 1 Ch. 64; Weatherall v. Thornburgh, 8 Ch. D. 261 (Ch. 1878) ;
Burt v. Sturt, 10 Hare 415, 68 Eng. Rep. 989 (Ch. 1853) ; Attorney-General v. Poulden,
3 Hare 555, 67 Eng. Rep. 501 (Ch. 1844) ; O'Neill v. Lucas, 2 Keen 313, 48 Eng. Rep.
649 (Ch. 1838) ; Griffiths v. Vere, 9 Ves. Jun. 127, 32 Eng. Rep. 550 (Ch. 1803).
22. Shaw v. Rhodes, 1 My. & Cr. 135, 40 Eng. Rep. 328 (Ch. 1836); Crawley v.
Crawley, 7 Sim. 427, 58 Eng. Rep. 901 (Ch. 1835).
23. Re Errington, 76 L.T.R. (N.S.) 616 (Ch. 1897); Jagger v. Jagger, 49 L.T.R.
(N.S.) 667 (Ch. 1884).
24. 16 Sim. 391, 60 Eng. Rep. 925 (Ch. 1848).
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II. OTHER PROBLEMS OF CONSTRUCTION
A. ACCUMULATIONS FOR THE BENEFIT OF A MINOR
There seems to be no serious problem in the construction of Subsections
(a), (b), and (c) of the Indiana statute.25 Subsection (d), however, raises a
difficult problem of interpretation. This subsection permits accumulations for
ten years beyond the minority of a beneficiary in being on the effective date
of the instrument made for the benefit of that minor. This period will permit
the longest accumulation possible under the statute for a testamentary disposi-
tion-during a minority (which might be one day less than twenty-one years)
and ten additional years. -
In order to qualify for this longer period, however, an accumulation
must be "for the benefit of such minor." These words are not found in the
Thellusson Act,27 but they have been read into the Pennsylvania statute
against accumulations, -8 and there is an express provision to the same effect
in the New York statute." The New York courts have construed this pro-
vision to mean that the accumulation'must be solely for the benefit of the
minor ;20 this construction would seem to be a reasonable and logical interpreta-
tion of the language used. The consequence is that an accumulation which is
not solely for the benefit of a minor is, in New York and Pennsylvania, bad in
its entirely since it is the purpose rather than the duration of the accumulation
which is objectionable. Therefore, in those states, there is no hope of
sustaining that part of an accumulation which is for the benefit of a minor,
while invalidating the direction that the accumulated income be paid ultimately
to persons other than the minor.3
25. See note 4 sutpra. In calculating the period of twenty-one years from the death
of the testator the day of the testator's death is excluded from the term of twenty-one
years. Hence, income received on the twenty-first anniversary of the testator's death
properly may be accumulated. Cf. Gorst v. Lowndes, 11 Sim. 434, 59 Eng. Rep. 940 (Ch.
1841). By analogy it would seem that income received on the twenty-first anniversary
of an inter vivos conveyance could be accumulated properly.
26. An inter vivos conveyance with an accumulation during the life of the grantor
would, under subsection (a), endure a longer time if the settlor lived longer than thirty-
one years after the conveyance.
27. The equivalent provisions of the Thellusson Act provides for accumulation "dur-
ing the minority . . . of any person . . . who . . . would, for the time being, if of
full age, be entitled unto . . . [the income] . . . so directed to be accumulated."
28. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. .20, §3251, lit re Wright's Estate, 227 Pa. 69,
75 Atl. 1026, 1028 (1910).
29. N. Y. Real Prop. Law §61; N. Y. Pers. Prop. Law §16.
30. Barbour v. DeForest, 95 N. Y. 13 (1884) ; Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 508 (1883).
31. In contrast, under the Indiana statute, an accumulation, directed for the period
specified in subsection (d), might fail because it was not for the benefit of a minor.
However, since the Indiana statute has several periods containing no restrictions as to the
purpose of the accumulation, the directed accumulation could be saved in part under one
of the other subsections of the statute: for example, the subsection permitting accumula-
tions for twenty-one years from the testator's death. See note 17 supra for an unreported
Indiana decision so holding.
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An additional requirement, endorsed in dictum in the New York cases,
is less defensible, viz., that this provision of the statute requires that the pro-
ceeds of an accumulation be paid over to the beneficiary absolutely at the end
of the accumulation. 2 Thus, in In re Byers' Will, the court considered an
instrument providing in part for accumulation of income during a minority.
The accumulated income was to be added to the capital and held in continued
trust to pay the income to the former minor until he reached age thirty, at
which time he was to receive the accumulation. The provision for accumula-
tion was invalid for reasons with which we are not here concerned, but the
court remarked that "The failure to provide . . . for the distribution of
accumulated income . . . when each child reaches his or her majority, is
likewise offensive. ' '1 3 The conclusion seems unsound. The accumulation was
for the benefit of the minor and it was solely for his benefit-he had complete
equitable ownership. The express provisions of the statute were satisfied.
It may be that as owner of the entire equitable interest the beneficiary should
be entitled to terminate the trust and disregard the fetters delaying his enjoy-
ment, but his right to do so, on which the courts of England and the United
States are in disagreement, 34 is a problem of the law of trusts, which must be
resolved without reference to the statute against accumulations, since the
problem can and does arise in cases where no accumulation is involved."
32. In Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 508, 516 (1883), the court remarked: ". . . we
think, that when the period of accumulation ceases, the accumulated fund shall then be
released from further restraint and paid over to the person for whose benefit the accu-
mulation was authorized." In both the Hegemnan case and Barbour v. DeForest the pro-
ceeds of the accumulation ultimately went to persons other than the minor. The accumu-
lations were clearly bad since they were not solely for the benefit of the minor; and the
above remark, therefore, was not essential to the decision. Similar statements made in
reliance upon Pray v. Hegeinan appear in other New York decisions. See, e.g., Tweddell
v. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co., 82 Hun. 602, 31 N. Y. S. 764, 766 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dep't
1894) ; In re Ziegler, 82 Misc. 10, 143 N. Y. S. 682, 684 (Surr. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1913). It is
believed that most of these decisions, like Pray v. Hegemnan, can be explained on the ground
that the accumulation is bad because it is not for the sole benefit of the minor. In the
Tweddell case the accumulations were given to the children of the minor upon her death.
The person ultimately benefited by the accumulation was not the minor and the accumula-
tion was necessarily bad. In the Ziegler case the court found an intention on the part of
the testator to direct distribution of the accumulation at the end of the minority, and in
any event there was a gift over of the corpus on the death of the minor under forty. If
the accumulations went with the corpus they were not solely for the benefit of the minor
and the disposition was therefore in violation of the statute.
33. 17 N. Y. S.2d 704, 705 (Surr. Ct. West. 1940).
34. Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch. 1841), holds that upon
reaching his majority the owner of an indefeasible equitable interest is entitled to im-
mediate enjoyment of the property despite the grantor's intention to delay his enjoyment.
See Warner v. Keiser, 93 Ind. App. 547, 570, 177 N. E. 369, 377 (1931). Cont ra: Claflin
v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454 (1889). See 54 HARV. L. REV. 839 (1941).
35. See note 34 supra.
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B. DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDS OF A VALID ACCUMULATION NOT FOR THE
BENEFIT OF A MINOR
Although the New York rule, requiring payment over to a minor in order
to qualify as being for the "benefit of a minor," seems illogical, and its adop-
tion by the courts of Indiana in the construction of the Indiana statute would
be unfortunate, there is authority upon which its adoption might be ration-
alized. The possibility that it might be adopted raises a more important
question. Should the statute against accumulations be construed to require
immediate distribution of the funds accumulated to a person in being at the
end of the permissible period of accumulation, or should the statute be con-
strued as allowing accumulated funds to be disposed of as other property
within the limits permitted by the rule against perpetuities?
The Indiana statute contains no positive direction requiring distribution
of the proceeds of a valid accumulation, nor does it contain any express
prohibition against the retention of such proceeds in continued trust. The
absence of any express provision is to be considered in light of the fact that
the common law had no objection to a provision directing that the proceeds
of an accumulation be held in trust for persons to be determined long after
the accumulation had ceased. 30
If immediate distribution of the proceeds of an accumulation is required,
therefore, it must be because not to do so would amount to .a continued and
forbidden "accumulation." Is there a continued accumulation when the pro-
ceeds of an accumulation are held in continued trust or disposed of other than
by outright gift to persons in being when the permissible period ends?
. First, a number of cases indicate that the word "accumulation" connotes
a continuing accretion and that the mere holding of a past accretiorP, with
dissipation of the current income, does not constitute a continuing accumula-
tion. 7 For example, in In re Pope, Farwell, J., stated that accumulation
meant "The growth of a sum of money by the continuous addition of the
interest to the principal" [emphasis added] ,3 and the Appellate Court of
Indiana, in construing the 1852 statute against accumulations, 0 remarked that
the word "accumulation" implies ". . . a withholding and using of the
income for the purpose of creating an increased and constantly increasing fund
for distribution at a future time. °40
Secondly, English courts have repeatedly assumed that a provision direct-
ing that the proceeds of an accumulation be held in continued trust was unob-
36. Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E.2d 792 (1937)..
37. See Note, 160 A.L.R. 439 (1946). "According to the ordinary definition, 'accu-
mulation of income' means the adding of interest or income to principal or corpus."
38. [1901] 1 Ch. 64, 69, 70.
39. Ind. Acts 1852, c.9; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1926) §12172.
40. Swain v. Bowers, 91 Ind. App. 307, 324, 158 N. E. 598, 604 (1927).
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jectionable. This is illustrated by In re Hawkins,4 1 which involved a will leav-
ing funds in trust. Income therefrom was to be applied as necessary for the
support of B for life, and the surplus was to accumulate for a period of twenty-
one years. At the end of the twenty-one years, the surplus thereafter accruing
was to become a part of the residue of the testator's estate. The residuary gift
was also in trust, with a life estate and remainders. At the end of the twenty-
one year period the surplus income from B's trust began to be paid to the
trustees of the residuary trust. The court was required to decide whether these
sums went into the residuary trust as principal or as income payable immedi-
ately to the life beneficiaries of that trust. The court held that it went to
the life tenants of the residuary trust as income; because if it were treated as
principal of that trust, there would be an indirect accumulation beyond the
permitted period.42
The important aspect of the case is that it seems to have been assumed
by the court and by all parties that the accumulations which had been added
to the principal of B's trust during the twenty-one year period did not have to
be distributed. Instead, they could, with propriety, be retained in the trust
and the income therefrom used to support B, any surplus being paid over to
the residuary trustees. The court expressly noted it was deciding the disposi-
tion of the income from prior valid accumulations.4 3 There could have been
no income from the prior accumulations unless, as the testator clearly intended,
they were held in continued trust after the accumulation had ceased.
The case of Re Parry gives more explicit recognition to the propriety of
holding the proceeds of an accumulation in trust after the expiration of the
permissible period of accumulation. 44 There a testator left funds in trust to
pay annuities to six named persons and to accumulate the surplus income.
41. [1916] 2 Ch. 570.
42. If income from trust 1 is paid into trust 2 as capital, there is, of course, an ac-
cumulation as effective as if the income were retained and added to the capital of the
first trust. Strangely, this was not immediately apparent to the English courts and prior
to the Hawkins opinion such dispositions were held proper. Cf. In re Pope, [1901] 1 Ch.
64; O'Neill v. Lucas, 2 Keen 313, 48 Eng. Rep. 649 (Ch. 1838) ; Crawley v. Crawley, 7 Sim.
427, 58 Eng. Rep. 901 (Ch. 1835). The only American authority discovered which in-
volved such a disposition is it re Byer's Will, 17 N. Y. S.2d 704 (Surr. Ct. West. 1940).
43. Cf. In re Garsido, [1919] 1 Ch. 132. A testamentary trust directed payment of
an annuity to B for life. Upon his death the property was to fall into the testator's
residuary estate, which was also held in trust. At the death of B it appeared that the
income of his trust had not been exhausted and that there was an accumulation aggregat-
ing £12,000. Part of this sum had been accumulated legitimately within twenty-one years
of the testator's death. The remainder had been accumulated in violation of the statute.
The £12,000 went into the residuary trust and, as the Hawkins case, the court was re-
quired to decide whether it went to the life tenant or was to be held in trust for the
remaindermen. It was held that the proper accumulation, that which accrued within the
permissible twenty-one year period, became a part of the capital of the residuary trust.
But accumulations after the legitimate period could not be added to the capital of the
residuary trust without infringing the Thellusson Act. This was an express recognition
of the propriety of holding in continued trust the proceeds of a valid accumulation.
44. 60 L.T.R. (N.S.) 489 (Ch. 1889).
INDIANA STATUTES
Upon the death of the survivor of the annuitants there was a gift over to X.
Some of the annuitants died. The property was far in excess of that required
to provide payment of the remaining annuities. X therefore asked for immedi-
ate payment to him of the accumulations. The court, in holding that he was
'not entitled, proceeded on this rationale: The accumulation was good for a
period of twenty-one years from the testator's death. At the end of that time
the surplus income thereafter accruing would devolve by intestacy. If the
accumulations during the twenty-one year period were paid out, the fund
producing income would be diminished to the detriment of the next of kin.
If the proceeds of the accumulation had to be paid out at the end of the
accumulation, the next of kin could never receive the income from them.
The court's reasoning, therefore, was founded upon the proposition that the
proceeds of a valid accumulation could, and if the testator so directed must,
be held in continued trust after the accumulation had ceased."
These authorities," and the absence of any contrary authority,4 7 justify
the statement that the Thellusson Act does not require distribution of the
proceeds of an accumulation at the end of the permissible period of accumula-
tion. Since the Indiana statute was presumably enacted with knowledge of
these precedents, it should be construed to permit a testator or settlor to make
45. A similar explanation might be given for the decision in Harbin v. Masterman,
L. R. 12 Eq. 559 (1871). Cf. In re Walpole, 102 L. J. 209 (Ch. 1932) where property was
left in trust to accumulate the income during the lifetime of B. The fund and its accu-
mulations after the death of B were to be held in trust to pay the income to X. The
directed accumulation was good only for twenty-one years from the death of the testatrix.
After twenty-one years the income passed as intestate property. The court had to decide
whether the income arising from the accumulated income from real estate held in trust,
went to the heir or the next of kin. The problem could not have arisen had not the
proceeds of an accumulation been held in trust after the accumulation ceased.
46. Cf. In re Hodson's Settlement, 108 L. J. 200 (Ch. 1939) ; Weatherall v. Thorn-
burgh, 8 Ch. D. 261 (1878). The consistent failure of the courts to consider the dis-
position of the proceeds of so much of an accumulation as is valid, reflects an assumption
that the proceeds of a valid accumulation may with propriety follow the fund which
produced them. Cf. Mathews v. Keble, L. R. 4 Eq. 467 (1867) ; Burt v. Sturt, 10 Hare
415, 68 Eng. Rep. 989 (Ch. 1853) ; Edwards v. Tuck, 3 De G. M. & G. 40, 43 Eng. Rep.
17 (Ch. 1853); Jones v. Maggs, 9 Hare 605, 68 Eng. Rep. 654 (Ch. 1852); Gorst v.
Lowndes, 11 Sim. 434, 59 Eng. Rep. 940 (Ch. 1841) ; Eyre v. Marsden, 2 Keen 564, 48
Eng. Rep. 744 (Ch. 1838).
47. There is secondary authority with a contrary inference. Simes, supra note 12, at
418, poses the hypothetical case of an accumulation during the minority of X with a
direction to add the accumulations to the principal which is to be held in trust to pay the
'income to X for life and upon his death to his estate. Simes states: "The accumulations
during X minority are valid. The difficulty is that at the end of his minority they are
capitalized and not released. It is generally held that this constitutes an illegal accumula-
tion, even though, interest is not compounded beyond the permissible period." As author-
ity he cites In re Kirby's Estate, 227 Pa. 69, 75 Atl. 1026 (1910) ; Barbour v. DeForest,
95 N. Y. 13 (1884) ; and Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 508 (1883). In all three of these
cases, the accumulation was bad because it was not solely for the benefit of a minor; the
remarks regarding payment over at the end of the accumulation were obiter dicta. Also
cited are In re Hawkins, [1916] 2 Ch. 570; In re Garside, [1919] 1 Ch. 132. But, as has
been previously suggested these cases really provide authority for the propriety of hold-
ing the proceeds of a valid accumulation in continued trust.
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any disposition of the proceeds of an accumlation which does not violate the
rules against remoteness. It should not be construed to interdict future
interests in the proceeds of an accumulation,48 unless the accumulation is for
the benefit of a minor, and even then, future interests solely for the benefit of
a minor should not be objectionable.4"
C. DISPOSITION OF INCOME SUBJECT TO A VOID DIRECTION FOR Accumu-
LATION
An additional problem of construction is posed by statutory provisions
for the disposition of income subject to a void direction for accumulation.
The Indiana statute, the Thellusson Act, the Pennsylvania and the Illinois
statutes contain substantially identical provisions, in the following tenor:
. . . in every case where any accumulation shall be directed otherwise
than [as aforesaid, such] direction shall be [null and] void . . . and
the [income, rents, issues, interests, profits and produce] of such
property directed to be accumulated . . . shall go to and be received
by such person or persons as would have been entitled thereto if such
accumulation had not been directed.5"
Since the Thellusson Act antedates the others, an examination of English
cases will aid in construction of this language. Lord Langdale said that it did
not appear that the statute was to operate to alter any disposition made by the
testator, except his direction to accumulate.' All the other directions of the
will as to the time of payment, substitution, or any contingencies were to take
effect according to the true construction of the will unaltered by the effect of
the statute. In Green v. Gascoyne the testator directed an accumulation during
the lives of his wife and sister and the survivor of them. The accumulation
was good for twenty-one years after the testator's death, but no longer. The
income after the twenty-one year period was disposed of as in intestacy. The
court explained this result by saying:
Although the trust for accumulation is cut down and reduced to a
limited period, the whole of the rest of the will remains in point of
disposition, in point of the meaning, effect and true interpretation
48. In Madeline Shields Powell v. Indiana Trust Company ,described in note 17 supra,
the court expressly held that the retention of the proceeds of a valid accumulation in con-
tinued trust beyond the period of permissible accumulation did not constitute a continuing
accumulation and was not in violation of the statute. The proceeds of the accumulation
were ultmately to be distributed to remaindermen not in being on the death of the testa-
tor. The court held that this was not objectionable under the statute.
49. Decision of this question was not required in the Powell case, #24261, decided by
Morgan Circuit Court May 26, 1950, and no other Indiana decision considering the
problem has been discovered.
50. There are immaterial variations in phraseology of the text in brackets in the
various acts. ILL. REV. STAT., c.30, §155 (1908) (without later amendments) : IND. STAT.
ANN. (Burns Supp. 1945) §51-108; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit.20, §3251; Thel-
lusson Act, 1800, 39 & 40 GEo. III, c.98.
51. Elborne v. Goode, 14 Sim. 165, 175, 60 Eng. Rep. 320, 324 (Ch. 1844).
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of its language, precisely as if there had been no such operation per-
formed by the statute. . . The result is that there is a hiatus be-
tween the period when the accumulation ceases by law and the period
when the accumulation is directed to cease by the will; there is
nothing in the will to catch the rents which arise during that hiatus;
and those rents accordingly belong to the heir at law. 2
It is thus clear under the Thellusson Act that the persons who "would
have been entitled thereto if such accumulation. had not been directed" were
the next of kin or heirs, if the will made no other effective disposition of the
property; or if the will contained an effective residuary clause, the residuary
legatees were those who would have taken had the accumulation not been
directed.
53
In a few instances the English courts have recognized that elimination of
a void direction to accumulate may benefit someone other than the next of kin
or the residuary legatee." Thus, in Coombe v. Hughes5' there was a gift of an
equitable life estate which was qualified by a subsequent direction to accumu-
late. The court said that the moment the Thellusson Act interf erred, by direct-
ing that the accumulations beyond twenty-one years should be null and void,
the excess had to be struck out of the will. The gift remained unaffected.
The excess did not fall into the residue or go to the next of kin, but remained
part of the legacy out of which it was intended to be carved.5"
Of the state statutes,5 7 that of Pennsylvania has been given a construction
consistent with that of the Thellusson Act if the decisions of an heretical
52. 4 De G. J. & S. 565, 570, 572, 46 Eng. Rep. 1038, 1040, 1041 (Ch. 1865).
53. See GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PEm'rTUTIES §704 (4th ed. 1942) and cases cited.
Ordinarily there would be no acceleration of subsequent gifts to avoid an intestacy with
respect to the liberated income. See Weatherall v. Thornburgh, 8 Ch. D. 261, 271, 272
(Ch. 1878) ; Elborne v. Goode, 14 Sim. 165, 176, 60 Eng. Rep. 320, 324 (Ch. 1845).
54. These deviations from the usual result have been variously expressed. LEwiN,
TRUSTS 93 (1888) says that if an estate is devised, subject to a void direction to accu-
mulate, in such terms that the void accumulation, if valid, would have been construed a
mere charge, the accumulation will, like any other charge which fails, sink for the
benefit of the devisee. Compare the statement in Gray, op. cit. supra note 53, at §707, that
when there is a present gift to one for life, with remainder over, and a void provision for
accumulation, the released income goes to the life tenant during his life.
55. 34 Beav. 127, 55 Eng. Rep. 582 (Ch. 1865).
56. Similarly, in Trickey v. Trickey, 3 My. & K. 560, 565, 40 Eng. Rep. 213, 215
(Ch. 1832), the life tenant received the proceeds of an invalid accumulation. The case
is cited by Gray (see note 54 supra) as an instance in which the proceeds of a valid ac-
cumulation did not go to the residuary legatee or the next of kin. Lewin (see note 54
supra) believes the life tenant took because she was also the testator's heiress at law. The
opinion merely states that she took because she was "the person who would have been
entitled if such accumulation had not been directed."
57. While the Illinois statute has been before the courts, the decisions involving it
contain no useful information as to the meaning of the statutory language. See Booth
v. Krug, 368 Ill. 487, 14 N. E.2d 645 (1938) ; Northern Trust Co. v. Blake, 291 Ill. App.
605, 9 N. E.2d 347 (1937) ; Webb v. Webb, 340 Ill. 407, 172 N. E. 730 (1930) ; Wills v.
Southwell, 334 Ill. 448, 166 N. E. 70 (1929).
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interlude are ignored. 58 The present law of Pennsylvania is represented by
Weinmann's Estate.50 There the testatrix left funds in trust to accumulate
until her grandson reached the age of forty. The income from the augumented
fund was then to be paid to the grandson for life, and on his death the fund
was to be distributed among his children. If there were no children, the fund
was to pass as a part of the testatrix's residuary estate. The accumulation was
invalid altogether, and the court held that the liberated income went to the
testatrix's next of kin. The grandson was held not to be the person entitled
had no accumulation been directed. Later Pennsylvania cases have made it
clear that the persons entitled to the excess where the accumulation is declared
void are the residuary legatees if there is an effective residuary clause, 0 or
the next of kin if there is no operative residuary clause.6'
However, where there is in terms a gift of an entire equitable interest
subject to an invalid direction for accumulation, the proceeds of the invalid
accumulation may accrue to the benefit of the owner of the equitable estate.
Thus, in In re Maris' Estate6 2 the testator left the residue of his estate in
trust to pay the income to his wife for life and upon her death over. The
will directed that all stock dividends be treated by the trustees as principal.
This provision was void as an accumulation because of an express provision
of the Pennsylvania statute. 3 The court held that such dividends went to the
wife by virtue of the gift to her of the whole net income of the property.
The case is the Pennsylvania counterpart of the English doctrine of Combe
v. Hughes.
64
Therefore, when the Indiana statute was enacted the words "persons who
would have been entitled thereto if such accumulation had not been directed"
had a well established meaning. They entitled the next of kin if there were
no effective residuary clause; they entitled the residuary legatees if there
were an effective residuary gift; and in rare instances they entitled the owner
of an equitable interest from which the void accumulation was attempted to be
carved.
The fact that the meaning of this language was well established compli-
58. The heresy born in Washington's Estate, 75 Pa. 102 (1874), and given stature in
In re Farnum's Estate, 191 Pa. 75, 43 Atl. 203 (1899), indicated that an invalid direction
to accumulate during the minority of an annuitant required the proceeds of the invalid
accumulation to be paid to the annuitant. This would be proper only if the annuitant
were also the testator's next of kin, a circumstance not discussed by the court.
59. 223 Pa. 508, 72 Atl. 806 (1909).
60. In re Lowe's Estate, 326 Pa. 375, 192 Atl. 405 (1937) ; It re Wright's Estate, 227
Pa. 69, 75 At. 1026 (1910).
61. In re Thistle's Estate, 263 Pa. 60, 106 Atl. 94 (1919) ; In re Roney's Estate, 277
Pa. 127, 75 Atl. 1061 (1910).
62. 301 Pa. 20, 151 Atl.. 577 (1930).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1930) tit.20, §3251. The Indiana statute has an express
provision to the contrary. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1945) §51-107(b).
64. See discussion p. 53 supra.
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cates the problem created by the inclusion in the Indiana act of an additional
provision not appearing in the Thellusson Act, or the Pennsylvania or Illinois
statutes. That provision reads:
If by reason of a disposition in the creating instrument subject to a
condition precedent it is impossible to determine what person or
persons would have been entitled to the income had no accumulation
contrary to the provisions of this act . . . been directed, such income
so directed to be accumulated shall go to those persons who would
have been entitled thereto had no such disposition subject to a con-
dition precedent been made. 5
It is obvious that under the English and Pennsylvania statutes the persons
who would take if the accumulation had not been directed would always be
determinable. If there were an effective residuary gift, the residuary legatees
would be ascertainable. If they were not, the income would go as in intestacy ;"
and the next of kin would be ascertainable, or, if there were none, the sovereign
would be entitled.0 7 Thus, the condition referred to in the Indiana statute
could never arise. It would never be ". . . impossible to determine what...
persons would have been entitled . . . had no accumulation . . . been
directed. .... "
This paradox can be explained if it be assumed that the Legislature in-
tended the statute to read "such persons as would have been entitled thereto
by the terms of the will."'8 If that construction be adopted, then cases may
arise in which it will be "impossible to determine what persons would have
been entitled" under the will, and the added provision of the Indiana statute
will then become operative to throw the accumulation to the next of kin. The
provision was undoubtedly intended to insure this result which is achieved in
England and Pennsylvania without such explicit statutory assistance.
A case will illustrate the situation intended to be reached by the Indiana
statute. In Elborne v. Goode, 9 there was a testamentary trust to pay annuities
to named annuitants and to accumulate the surplus income. There was a
residuary gift to the issue of the testator's nephews and nieces living upon the
death of the survivor of the named annuitants. The accumulation was bad
after the lapse of twenty-one years, but the residuary gift did not effectively
dispose of the liberated income because the legatees were incapable of being
65. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1945) §51-108(a).
66. In re Roney's Estate, 277 Pa. 127, 75 Atl. 1061 (1910) ; Grim's Appeal, 109 Pa.
391. 1 Atl. 212 (1885) ; Elborne v. Goode, 14 Sim. 165, 60 Eng. Rep. 320 (Ch. 1844).
67. Harbin v. Masterman, L. R. 12 Eq. 559 (1871).
68. Insofar as the courts of England and Pennsylvania are concerned, the reading in
of such words will be of academic interest only. It is immaterial whether the next of
kin are entitled by virtue of the dispositive provisions of the statute against accumulations
or by virtue of the laws relating to the disposition of property in intestacy. If the ac-
cumulations statute does not cover the case, the property is left undisposed of, and the
laws of inheritance necessarily dictate its disposition.
69. 14 Sim. 165, 60 Eng. Rep. 320 (Ch. 1844).
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determined until the death of the last annuitant, and that had not occurred.
The court, therefore, held that the next of kin were entitled, being the persons
entitled had the direction for accumulation not been made.7 1
The same result would be reached under the Indiana statute, but by two
steps. First, the persons entitled after the lapse of the accumulation would
be the residuary legatees. Second, because of a condition precedent it would
be impossible to determine the persons entitled to the residuary gift. There-
fore, the gift should be disregarded and the next of kin be entitled as the
persons "who would be entitled had no such disposition subject to a condition
precedent been made."
It is a reasonable conclusion that the unique provision in the Indiana
statute was not intended to result, and does not result, in a disposition of the
proceeds of a void accumulation different from that achieved under the
Thellusson Act or the Pennsylvania statute.
III. MISCELLANEOUS DRAFTING PROBLEMS
The advent of the marital deduction and the frequent tax advantage of
an accumulating trust7 ' make it likely that the provisions of the Indiana
accumulation statute will be used. In some instances estate and income tax
advantages cafr be obtained by the use of a testamentary trust which will not
qualify for a marital deduction and which permits accumulation of income,
coupled with a second trust which does qualify for the marital deduction and
which permits invasion of principal. The accumulations in one trust offset
the invasions of principal in the other. The invasions reduce the widow's
estate tax, and the accumulations incur no estate tax on the death of the widow.
It is, therefore, appropriate to consider what pitfalls in this statute await
the draftsman of instruments providing for accumulations. A number of
dangers have been expressly anticipated and avoided. Directions for accumula-
tions of income for the "upkeep, repair, or proper management" of the trust
estate are validated.7 2 Provisions that stock dividends and stock rights are
to be treated as capital will not result in an unlawful accumulation.7 3 Any pro-
vision for a sinking or reserve fund is unobjectionable. 74
Although the statute makes no reference to capital gains, retention of
such gains as capital of a trust should not amount to an unlawful accumulation,
in view of the Indiana rule adopted prior to the statute that, in the absence of
70. A like result has been reached in Pennsylvania. See note 66 supra.
71. Since the income of the trust is not distributable and therefore not taxable to any
beneficiary under-§165, I.R.C., it is taxed to the trustee. The trust may thus be used to
accumulate income in a lower bracket than is available to the ultimate beneficiary.
72. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1945) §51-107(a).
73. Id. at §51-107(b).
74. Id. at §51-107(c). This language is general and it may be anticipated that there
will be litigation to determine what accumulations denominated "sinking fund" will fall
within its shelter.
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an express direction in the will, such increments are for trust purposes
principal rather than income.75 Nor should directions which provide that incre-
ment arising from the purchase of bonds at a discount be treated as principal
be held a violation of the statute.78
Directions that particular receipts, which are income in judicial contempla-
tion, be treated as principal may result in a violation of the statute. Thus a
direction that mineral royalties be treated as principal has been held invalid
as an illegal accumulation.7
7
Discretionary powers in trustees to allocate items to the principal in their
uncontrolled discretion involve potential violations- of the statute. Such
powers, in the absence of an accumulations problem, are generally held to be
valid ;78 and the Court of Appeals of New York has held that such a provision
does not result in the type of accumulation intended to be stricken by the
statute against accumulations."0 Violation of the statute against accumulations
may also be avoided by construing trustees' powers to determine what is
income and what principal as limited to allocations permissible under it. In
other words, the courts ordinarily will not presume that the trustees are
empowered to do an unlawful act.s
The inclusion of any clause nullifying provisions inconsistent with the
accumulations statute is unlikely to be any easier of application or any more
effective than the provisions of the statute itself, but it may avoid suits for
construction. The statutory approval of accumulations for a gross period of
twenty-one years will save almost every provision for that length of time.
Hence it is only in long-term trusts that the problem becomes acute.
An accumulation measured by the minority of an unborn person cannot
be good in its entirety. And the validity of a provision for an accumulation
for the benefit of a minor in being to continue beyond minority and beyond
twenty-one years from the death of the testator, coupled with a direction that
75. Luery v. Addington, 76 N. E.2d 673 (Ind. 1948) ; Powell v. Madison Safe De-
posit & Trust Co., 208 Ind. 432, 196 N. E. 324 (1935).
76. 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS §240.2 (1939) recognizes the propriety of this practice. Pre-
sumably no recognized trust practice with respect to allocation between income and prin-
cipal should constitute a violation of the statute. A contrary argument was made and
rejected in the Powell case, note 17 supra.
77. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. .v. Douglas (IUn re Pettit's Estate),' 135 Minn. 413,'
161 N. W. 158 (1917).
78. Sears v. Childs, 309 Mass. 337, 35 N. E.2d 663 (1941) ; Dumaine v. Dumaine, 301
Mass. 214, 16 N. E.2d 625 (1938). See 2 Scow, TRUSTS §233.5 (1939).
79. Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 250 N. Y. 1, 164 N. E. 723 (1928), 29 CoL. L. Rav.
843 (1929).
80. In re Talbot's Will, 170 Misc, 138, 9 N. Y. S.2d 806 (Surr. Ct. Orange Co. 1939),
52 HARv. L. Rav. 1369. But see the contrary interpretation of the same will in Colt v.
Duggan, 25 F. Supp. 268 (S. D. N. Y., 1938). In the Powell case, note 17 supra, the
court held that such a discretionary power, unlimited on its face, related only to doubtful
items, the accumulation of which would not constitute an unlawful accumulation. To
the extent the power purported to go further than this it would merely be invalidated
by the statute.
58 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the proceeds of the accumulation be held in continued trust to pay the income
to the minor and the principal upon his death to his estate, is undetermined.
The latter disposition should be good, but until the Indiana courts have ruled
upon it, such a settlement is probably an invitation to litigation.
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